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Abstract 
This paper examines individual tax morale in Russia before and after the introduction of flat tax reform in 2001. 
The World Values (WVS) and European Values Survey (EVS) are used to compare individual tax morale in 1999, 
2006 and 2011. An ordered probit regression model is applied to study the effects of socio-demographic and 
institutional variables on individual tax morale. A new variable for employment sector that appeared in 2006 and 
2011 values surveys is included in our model. The probit regression results revealed significant coefficients for 
income scale and the employment sector variables with negative marginal effects on tax morale. 
Socio-demographic variables have varying effects on tax morale while institutional variables are positively 
related to individual tax morale for the three years. To detect linear trend associations, Mantel-Haenszel 
hypothesis test results indicate that individual tax morale for Russia has not changed in the years before and after 
flat tax reform.  
Keywords: flat tax reform, ordered probit regression, tax morale, employment sector, income level 
1. Introduction 
1.1 Why We Pay Tax 
Taxes are important for a country and its citizens. Tax revenues allow the government to provide public goods 
and services that support and maintain the economic machine. These public goods and services include 
infrastructure such as roads, telecommunications, railways, electric power, and government offices and 
institutions. Tax revenue also supports administrative and policy-making services employed to manage the 
economy and financial markets, and to educate, protect, and care for its citizens. The US Internal Revenue 
Service described tax gap components as non-filing, under-reporting and under-payment. In the US, the 
under-reporting component remains the largest component since 2001. Tax filers who evade taxes by declaring 
improper deductions, overstating expenses, credits or exemptions, belong to this category. Tax evasion activities 
are illegal as they reduce tax revenues, create a sense of unfairness, alter income distribution, and impact on 
public services for citizens.    
This paper analyzes individual tax morale in Russia from a social-psychology perspective. The next section of 
the paper summarizes the literature review on perspectives in tax compliance research. Our interest in Russia 
stems from the implementation of a flat tax system in 2001, and the impact of flat tax on tax morale in the 
country. Survey data from WVS (World Values Survey, 2014) for 2006 and 2011 and from EVS (European 
Values Survey, 2014) for 1999 were analyzed using an ordered probit regression model that included income 
level, sector of employment, demographics and institutional variables. The dependent variable, tax morale is a 
ten-scale index with two extreme points, “fully justified” and “always justified”. The 10-scale index response to 
the tax morale question is transformed into a 4-point scale levels based on the variability of responses to the 
question. The model study includes the new variable on employment sector in surveys completed in 2006 and 
2011. EVS survey data for Russia is analyzed for 1999, and then compared with two transition years in 2006 and 
2011 using WVS survey data. Our research study builds upon the work of Alm, Vazquez and Torgler (2006) on 
the attitudes of Russians toward paying taxes during transitioning years from a centrally planned economy to a 
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market economy during the 1990s. The purpose of our study is to explore the impact of a major tax reform on 
individual tax morale in a transition economy. The findings from this study may have implications on taxation 
policies in transition economy countries and developing countries.  
1.2 Tax Research 
Tax research can be viewed as driven by economic concern for a widening tax gap, the need to collect more tax 
revenues, and the need to understand the social-psychology and cultural effects on tax compliance behavior. The 
two broad categories of tax research studies are focused in understanding and explaining tax compliance 
behavior (Frey, 2003; Torgler & Schneider, 2009; Maksvytienė & Šinkūnienė, 2012; Doerrenberg & Peichl, 
2013), and in detection of tax fraud using data mining approach (Farid & Tkiouat, 2012, Gonzalez & Velasquez, 
2013). Early tax research literature based on the utility maximizing economic theory has shifted to a growing 
attention on understanding tax behavior based on social-psychology theories (Devos, 2007) 
1.2.1 Deterrent-Focused 
Deterrence models based on expected utility maximization to predict tax evasion assume individuals evade tax 
when expected gain exceeds the cost of detection and penalty. Phillips (2011) described the ideology underlying 
tax deterrence research paradigm as driven by a belief that “it is an inherent wish of taxpayers to pay no tax 
liability, and are deterred from evading taxes in the face of risks of tax audit, fraud detection and penalty”. 
Bloomquist (2012) employed agent-based modeling to assess the impact of auditing strategy alternatives on tax 
compliance behavior in misreporting cases. The approach is based on a 2-stage model of verification and 
validation testing with assumptions about taxpayer behavior based on knowledge accumulated from field studies, 
laboratory experiments and random audits. In another computational model application, DeBarr and Harwood 
(2004) suggested the use of relational data mining to screen tax returns using indicators or criteria endorsed by 
tax compliance experts. Farid and Tkiouat (2012) proposed a data mining approach in their fraud detection 
model for improving efficiency in auditing process. They suggested that causes for tax fraud include complexity 
of the tax system, moral considerations, social and cultural norms, and tax administration. In the Gonzalez and 
Velasquez (2013) study, different data mining approaches were compared to characterize and detect users of 
falsified invoices based on information about their tax payments for Chile.  
Deterrence models analyze the cost-benefit of maximizing expected utility in tax evasion gamble experiments 
that are based on “economics of crime” (Becker, 1968). The Allingham and Sandmo (1975) deterrence model is 
based on the assumption that “a typical individual pays taxes only because of fear of detection and punishment”. 
Empirical and experimental studies however revealed conflicting results. Countries with low tax evasion have 
relatively low deterrence measures and higher tax rates. Yitzhaki (1974) explained that the inverse relationship 
between tax rate and evasion exists because of how the penalty is derived. If the penalty is proportional to the tax 
amount understated as opposed to being proportional to income understated as assumed in Allingham et al. 
model, then the reward-to-risk ratio remains unchanged as the tax rate increases. Therefore, if the higher tax rate 
has only an income effect, the higher tax rate will correspond with lower tax evasion for the risk-averse 
individual. 
Frey (2003) proposed a different strategy in studying taxation based on crowding theory and empirical results 
that predicted high levels of tax evasion with high levels of tax compliance in countries such as the United States 
and Switzerland. The incongruous empirical results seem to suggest that certain group level effects may have an 
influence on tax compliance behavior. Tax compliance is described to be a “quasi-voluntary” behavior that 
“cannot be reasonably enforced by deterrence measures,” and that the true cost of tax administration is not just 
the auditing and related costs, but also the cost of ensuring that taxpayers are willing to pay taxes. The latter cost 
is based on crowding theory on the effects of incentives or punishments that undermine intrinsic motivation. 
Thus, the question of “why people pay taxes” as opposed to “why people evade taxes” has been proposed as a 
direction in tax research (Alm, Martinez-Vazquez & Torgler, 2010). 
1.2.2 Tax Morale and Tax Compliance 
Tax morale is an individual quality that is associated with compliance behavior. In analyzing the ethics of paying 
taxes, the deontological view holds that the action is morally good, while the teleological view sees the moral 
standard as the value in the outcome of such an action. A deontological perspective individual views the moral in 
paying taxes as simply following the rules. A teleological perspective individual on the other hand views the 
outcome of paying taxes as the driver for moral action. Overarching cultural and social norms and religious 
beliefs may therefore have an influence on paying taxes. If public goods and services are viewed as having a 
positive impact on the quality of life in a civilized society, the individual is more likely to pay taxes.   
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Tax compliance is a voluntary behavior in which the individual reports all income earned. In general, higher tax 
compliance is found with third party information reporting or withholding. Tax compliance is described to be 
influenced by many factors such as disposition towards public institutions, perceived fairness of taxes, prevailing 
social norms and perceived risks of being caught and punished (Franzoni, 1999). In contrast, evading taxes is an 
illegal act and is described as failure to report or under-reporting of income and is punishable. This is in contrast 
to someone who avoids paying taxes legally by exploiting loopholes that exist in tax laws, or by filing for 
deductions, credits and adjustments to income by proving that the criteria or standards for claims are met.   
Cummings, Martinez-Vasquez and Torgler (2009), revealed a significant correlation between tax morale and tax 
compliance. Tax morale and institutional quality were significant predictors for shadow economy in another 
study (Torgler & Schneider, 2009).  
Cummings et al. (2009) investigated how tax morale affects compliance in Botswana and South Africa, 
neighboring countries with different social histories. Their study results revealed that while tax compliance 
increases with individual perception of good governance, a smaller increase is also observed when less good 
governance is perceived. Perception of good governance indicated by individual responses to enforcement 
practices in audits and penalties is observed to correlate with tax morale. While enforcement effort has a positive 
effect on compliance, its effect is reduced by perception of less good governance. In an attitudinal and behavioral 
survey on tax compliance in Ireland, a high level of tax morale is observed among participants surveyed (Cleary, 
2009). However, a significant proportion of the survey’s participants perceived that “deliberate tax evasion is on 
the increase” and “few people report all their incomes”. The survey also revealed that at least half of the 
participants believed that “paying too much taxes”, “taxes collected are used poorly”, and “not getting paid 
enough” are reasons why people avoid paying taxes.  
Doerrenberg et al. (2013) investigated the effects of progressive taxation on individual tax morale. The cross 
country analysis using the World Values survey data for 4 waves is a logistic regression model with tax morale as 
the dependent variable, with explanatory and control variables were tax progressivity, economic indicators, 
demographic variables, national pride, trust and confidence in government and religiosity variables. Their results 
showed that women and married people have higher tax morale than men and singles respectively. Other 
variables that have a positive effect on tax morale were religiosity, patriotism, being retired and being employed. 
Their findings showed that tax progressivity has a decreasing positive association with tax morale which 
suggested that “progressive taxes contribute to less tax evasion and higher perceived fairness and equality”. 
Since the causality in the relationship cannot be inferred, it may well be that citizens with higher tax morale 
support a more progressive tax system.   
Maksvytiene and Sikuniene (2012) proposed that tax culture is a concept that encompasses attitudes and 
behaviors of participants in a tax system, and its tax relations with participants to increase tax revenue. Their 
proposed tax culture model includes macroeconomic factors such as the country’s economic development, social 
status of citizens, education system level, and participant experience and upbringing.  
An empirical study on tax morale for Latin American countries revealed findings that support social factors and 
institutional factors are significant determinants of tax morale (Taschetti, 2013). However, a comparison of tax 
morale between Argentina and Chile is inconsistent with the tax compliance estimates for these countries. 
Further analysis with an added interaction variable for perception of compliance improves the prediction on tax 
morale for Argentina. An important conclusion from the study is that tax compliance is a function of both tax 
morale and deterrence, and their interaction in a feedback loop may help to improve understanding of tax 
compliance. This conclusion is similar to the Torgler (2005) study of tax morale in the same region. His findings 
revealed that individuals who have knowledge of tax evasion of others have significantly lower tax morale.     
The shadow economy has been associated with tax morale in various studies (Tekeli, 2011; Alm & Torgler, 2005; 
Torgler, 2011; Torgler & Schneider, 2009). Schneider (2007) defined shadow economy as market-based legal 
goods and services that were produced but were not reported as income. Shadow economy is estimated using the 
DYMIMIC (dynamic multiple-indicators multiple-causes) model.  In this economic model, money supply since 
activities related to the shadow economy are transacted in cash, and real GNP (Gross National Product) are the 
main variables.  
Frey and Weck (1983) pointed out that results are different from various approaches to derive the hidden 
economy such as in conducting interviews, experiments on risk aversion, measuring labor participation rate, 
estimating tax fraud estimation and analyzing currency payments related to tax-avoiding activities. They 
proposed a shadow economy model that is based on human behavior and institutional characteristics. Their 
multiple regression model’s determinants are taxes and tax regulations, tax morality and perception of tax burden, 
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and labor participation rate, unemployment rate and working time as labor market variables.  
Torgler, Schaffner and Macintyre (2008) employed several models to explore the “puzzle of tax compliance,” 
which refers to the unexpectedly high level of tax compliance predicted using economic models. A multivariate 
regression model is applied to estimate the shadow economy by regressing tax morale with GDP per capita, share 
of agriculture in GDP, share of urban population, labor force, marginal tax rate, region and fixed time as control 
variables. Their results revealed that “substantial growth in the shadow economy can lead to crowding out of 
willingness to pay taxes”, or tax morale. The size of the shadow economy is also found to be negatively 
correlated with trade, but is positively correlated with agricultural GDP and urbanization. Using experiments to 
examine the impact of tax morale on tax compliance, tax morale is found to have a strong and positive impact on 
tax compliance. Females and older individuals are more compliant, higher group transfer has a positive impact 
on tax compliance and individual wealth has a negative impact on tax compliance. A probit regression analysis 
on tax morale indicated that institutional quality, trust in the judicial system, gender, status, education and 
religion variables are significant. 
1.2.3 Russia Informal Sector 
Ever since the Soviet Union imploded, the former Soviet republics have been having a difficult time collecting 
the revenue they need to run their governments. However, some republics have done better than others. Estonia, 
Latvia and Lithuania, which have since joined the European Union, have a relatively strong system of public 
finance in place, by Soviet standards. Most of the other former Soviet republics and satellite countries in central 
and Eastern Europe have not fared as well. A large portion of the taxes that is legally owed in these republics is 
not being collected, for a variety of reasons (McGee, 2012).  
Two of the main reasons for the collection problems have to do with a system of public finance that is too weak 
and inefficient to gather the taxes, and the general attitude of the people, many of whom believe that their 
government is corrupt and has little or no moral claim on their income. 
Several studies have investigated the attitudes of the people in these former Soviet satellites and republics, and 
the conclusions reached are similar. A study of Armenian opinion found that people evade taxes because it is easy 
to do so and because of the widespread perception that their government is corrupt and therefore not entitled to 
the money (McGee, 1999). Studies of Bosnia and Herzegovina (McGee, Basic & Tyler, 2009), Bulgaria 
(Smatrakalev, 1998, 2012), Estonia (McGee, Alver & Alver, 2012), Poland (McGee & Bernal, 2006), Russia 
(Vaguine, 1998; Preobragenskaya & McGee, 2004), Slovakia (McGee & Tusan, 2008) and Ukraine (Nasadyuk & 
McGee, 2008) have reached similar conclusions. Figure 1 shows the public sector’s perception of corruption in 
Russia from 1999 to 2011 from the Transparency International Organization (2014). The Corruption Perception 
Index (CPI) score range from 1 to 10, with a low score indicating higher level of corruption for the country. 
Compared to other countries, Russia CPI ranking placed it in the second to the third lowest group of countries in 
the world during these years. 
 
 
Figure 1. Corruption perception index for Russia 
 
Other reasons found in studies of non-Soviet republics and satellites for why tax evasion is justified is the 
perception that the government is wasteful in its spending habits, or that the tax system is unfair (Crowe, 1944; 
McGee, 2012). Such studies have been done for Greece (Ballas & Tsoukas, 1998), Iran (McGee & Ardakani, 
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2009), and Romania (McGee, 2006).  
Working off the books has both positive and negative effects for those who work in the informal sector. The 
obvious positive effect is that workers get to keep 100 percent of what they earn. Some studies have found that 
the informal sector provides more flexibility and opportunities for creativity than does the formal sector. 
However, there is a downside as well. Some negative effects of working in the informal sector include lower 
wages, less job security and fewer fringe benefits such as insurance and pensions (Ferrel-i-Carbonell & Gërxhani, 
2011).  
If one applies economic analysis and cost-benefit theory, one might reasonably conclude that reducing the tax 
rate would increase compliance. More people would find the benefit of evading taxes to exceed the cost when tax 
rates are high than when they are low. As tax rates decline, fewer people would conclude that tax evasion is 
worth the risk. However, it is unlikely that reducing tax rates will completely eliminate noncompliance for at 
least two reasons. Some people will evade taxes regardless of the tax rate because the system allows them to get 
away with evasion (McGee, 1999; Torgler, 2007, 2010). Others will evade because of the feeling that the 
government is not morally entitled to a slice of their income, or at least not the size of the slice it is taking 
(McGee, 2012). Tax morale was found to be negatively correlated with unemployment rate and inflation in Spain 
(Martinez-Vazquez & Torgler, 2009) and during an economic crisis (Heinemann, 2010). 
The informal sector or “shadow economy” comprises a large portion of the total Russian economy with as many 
as 38 million people working in the shadow economy, according to at least one report (Lysizin, 2013). As a result, 
much of the taxes raised in Russia are from sources other than the individual income tax, including the value 
added tax, which is the largest source of tax revenue (Wikipedia, 2014). However, there is some evidence to 
suggest that reducing the individual income tax rate has had a beneficial effect on the formal economy, as some 
workers shift from the informal sector to the formal, taxpaying sector (Slonimczyk, 2012). 
1.3 Russia Tax Reform 
According to the Encyclopedia of the Nations, “Russia’s tax system has been historically confusing, inefficient, 
unwieldy and overbearing.” During Russia’s transition period from 1992 to 1998, Gregory and Brooke (2000) 
noted that unreported economic activities for tax assessment was estimated to be around 20% to 40% of GDP in 
1995, with over 40% of its monetary assets circulated in the shadow economy. During this period, “tax collected 
was 40% to 60% of the assessed amount, thus a minimum of 40% of tax due was not collected on known income 
and economic activities.” Not factored into these estimates are shadow economy activities, revenue loss due to 
an overly-complex tax system, the general lack of tax compliance culture, and political deals on waived tax and 
non-monetary settlements. 
Berenson (2007) compared tax compliance attitudes in three post-communist countries: Poland, Russia and 
Ukraine using a binomial logit regression analysis. The Tax Compliance Attitudinal Survey incorporated 
questions related to theories about deterrence and quasi-voluntary tax compliance, and effects of prior experience 
and interaction with the tax authority. Quasi-voluntary theory on tax compliance is based on the notions that trust 
in government to provide goods and services for its people and trust in others in paying their fair share of taxes. 
The comparison revealed differences in attitudes in these countries. In the case of Russia and Ukraine, tax 
attitudes are found to be more influenced by deterrence measures, with higher significance for Russia.  
In 2001, Russia replaced progressive tax rates of 12%, 20% and 30%, with a single tax rate of 13%. The flat tax 
includes a standard deduction with additional deductions for education, medical and housing expenses. Adoption 
of the low 13% flat tax rate has been associated with growth in real Personal Income Tax (PIT) revenues of 26% 
in 2001, 21% in 2002 and 12% in 2003. The charts in Figure 2.1 show Personal Income tax rates before and after 
tax reform 2001, and in Figure 2.2 Russia Corporate tax rates from 2004 to 2014. 
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Figure 2.1. Russia personal income tax rate 
Source: Duncan, D. (2012, February). 
 
Figure 2.2. Russia corporate tax rate 
Source: www.tradingeconomics.com. 
 
Ivanova, Keen and Klemm (2005) investigated the increase in real PIT revenues in Russia after flat tax reform in 
2001, and its effect on tax compliance. Their economic analysis indicated that there is an increase in tax 
compliance with no evidence of a strong supply effect due to tax reform.  
The Gorodnichenko, Martinez-Vazquez and Peter (2009) economic analysis is based on a difference-in 
difference (DID) and regression discontinuity approach using data from the RLMS. Their model included 
deadweight loss from PIT in the presence of tax evasion based on consumption response. Results from their 
analysis showed that the tax reform had the effect of decreasing tax evasion by an estimated 9% to 12% in 
unreported income for households with the reduced marginal tax rate. Moreover, their examination of tax 
enforcement records from before and after tax reform from 1999 to 2003 found no evidence to support the 
increase in tax revenues after tax reform due to better enforcement effort by comparing accrued and received tax 
revenues, number of on-site audits, number of tax charges brought against state individuals and enterprises, 
individual entrepreneurs, number of blocked accounts and criminal cases. This led to their conclusion that the 
decline in tax evasion is attributed to an increase in voluntary compliance, and not to greater tax enforcement. 
Their consumption-income model with tax-evasion-adjusted deadweight loss resulted in at least 30% smaller 
efficiency gain than the standard method that considered only the income response. The deadweight loss in their 
model refers to social well-being that is lost due to taxation policy. If the cost of evasion is based on the cost of 
being caught and fines and not on the real cost of hidden income, the adjustment for deadweight loss in their 
consumption-income model is likely to be a more accurate reflection of efficiency gain due to tax reform for 
Russia.   
Duncan (2012) suggested that the increase in PIT may be due to factors other than the lower marginal tax rate. 
Lower tax rates have been empirically associated with behavioral responses such as change in number of hours 
worked, number of jobs, and income shifting. Duncan and Peter (2010) analyzed the effect of Russia low flat tax 
18%
19%
20%
21%
22%
23%
24%
25%
www.ccsenet.org/ibr International Business Research Vol. 8, No. 1; 2015 
66 
 
reform on work hours for men and women. Their DID regression analysis indicated that tax reform has resulted 
in increasing the probability of finding jobs for both men and women, and a significant increase in working hours 
for men but not for women. Further analysis on working hour distribution for women labor supply effects 
revealed a positive effect on labor response for part-time and the highest work hour distributions with no effect 
on the middle work hour distribution. Their conclusions on labor effects due to tax reform is that the small 
“reform-induced change in labor supply is an unlikely explanation for the amplified PIT revenues following the 
reform”, and the flattening of the tax rate is more likely to benefit countries with high tax non-compliance than 
countries with high tax compliance.  
Pogorletskiy and Söllner (2002) reported that Russia’s progressive tax system introduced during its early 
transition period in 1992 failed in implementation due to then existing informal institutions that are characterized 
as having a high level of mistrust towards the government, the importance of barter transactions, and taxpayers’ 
and authorities’ lack of experience with such a system. Russia’s tax reform of 2001 disbanded the progressive tax 
system and introduced the flat tax system, with one low tax rate of 13% for individuals, and in 2002 introduced a 
maximum corporate tax rate of 24%, which further dropped to 20% due to the global recession in 2008. Prior to 
the tax reform, corporations were at a 43% tax rate. Another important feature of the tax reform is the 
replacement of the four separate social security taxes with a unified regressive social security tax rate. In addition, 
employees are not required to pay into pension funds. A clear advantage of the low flat tax system is that it is a 
simplified system that makes “tax evasion less worthwhile and induce taxpayers with high incomes to leave the 
shadow economy and legalize their incomes”. Before the reform, employers paid employees low wages in their 
books, and paid remaining wages in cash to avoid social security taxes.  
So how does a progressive tax system compare to a flat tax system on the subject of tax morale? The 
Doerrenberg et al. (2013) cross country study on the effects of progressive tax rates on tax morale showed that 
progressive tax rates correlates positively with the tax morale level, and the positive impact of tax progressivity 
declines with higher income.  Their empirical analysis is based on a model of self-centered inequality aversion 
(Fehr and Schmidt, 1999) in which individuals dislike inequitable outcomes when comparing themselves to 
others in payoffs.  Their conclusions suggested that “progressive taxes contribute to less tax evasion and higher 
perceived fairness and equality” while it is also possible that higher tax morale and inequality aversion of 
citizens may facilitate governments to implement higher tax progressivity. 
2. Method 
2.1 Dataset and Variables 
For our analysis we used survey data from the World Value Survey (WVS) and European Value Study (EVS). 
The WVS consists of national questionnaire surveys conducted in countries in which their populations in total 
comprise 90 percent of the world’s population. The survey data is compiled into waves, covering periods of five 
years.  The survey is designed to collect individual perceptions, beliefs and attitudes on family, work, 
environment, religion, values, national identity, democracy, government system, politics, diversity, culture and 
subjective well-being. Similarly, the EVS provides insights of individual ideas, beliefs, preferences, attitudes, 
values and opinions all over Europe.  
The 1999 (wave 4), 2006 (wave 5) and 2011 (wave 6) year survey data consisted of 2040, 2500 and 2500 data 
records in total, respectively. In order to compare the results these three waves of data, we use a subset of the 
data for the following variables: TAX MORALE, as dependent variable, and a set of explanatory variables AGE, 
GENDER, education (EDUC), marital status (MAR.ST), perceived economic situation (CLASS), employment 
status (EMPL), trust in government and legal system (TRUST), national pride (NATL.PRIDE), work sector 
(WORK.SECTOR), and scale of income (INCOME.SCALE) as determinants of TAX MORALE Work sector is 
a new variable that appeared in the last two waves; wave 5 (2006) and wave 6 (2011). Definitions of all variables, 
along the survey questions on which the variables are based, can be found in Table A5 in the Appendix section of 
this paper. To verify the quality of the data, records with missing values in variables considered in our model 
were dropped. 
The TAX MORALE variable, originally on a ten-scale index with the two extreme points “1”-“never justified” 
and “10“-“always justified”, is rescaled to form a variable from 0 to 3, where 3 means “never justifiable” and 
value “0” means “always justified”. On this scale, a higher numeric score indicates a higher tax morale. The 
points 4 to 10 are combined in the value 0, due to lack of variability and simple interpretation.  
Data for the CLASS variable exists only for 2011. This question is not found in 1999 and the question was not 
asked for 2006. Further, a combined variable TRUST is formed using the average of the two variables (trust in 
government and legal system) for 2006/2011 and using only trust in legal system for 1999 (no question about 
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trust in government). 
Observations which have missing values are dropped from the original dataset resulting in a total of 2039, 1162 
and 1370 records are included in the analysis for 1999, 2006 and 2011 respectively. We excluded records with 
missing values and/or non-informative response. The data processing and analyses were done using the R 
programming language (R Core Team, 2012). Descriptive statistics for the variables are shown in Table A3 and 
Table A4 in Appendix A. 
The following sub-sections describe the groups of variables in our model. 
2.1.1 Income Level Factor 
Bilgin (2014) revealed that both income level and financial satisfaction have significant effects on tax morale 
among other variables such as age and education level for Spain. Individuals in the top income group with a high 
level of financial satisfaction have lower tax morale. Another empirical study on effects of financial satisfaction 
and happiness on tax morale in Asian countries has also indicated that these factors have a positive impact on tax 
morale (Torgler, 2004). 
The income distribution question is asked in WVS in the following way “On this card is an income scale on 
which 1 indicates the lowest income group and 10 the highest income group in your country. We would like to 
know in what group your household is. Please, specify the appropriate number, counting all wages, salaries, 
pensions and other incomes that come in”. Figure 3 shows the income scale distribution for complete 
observations in our dataset for 1999, 2006 and 2011. 
 
 
Figure 3. Income scale by year distribution 
 
Figure 4 shows sparklines for the distribution tax morale responses with a collapsed scale for tax morale, “0” for 
lowest morale and “3” for highest tax morale, and markers for the highest and lowest tax morale levels for each 
income scale.  
 
 
Figure 4. Tax morale distribution by income scale 
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A study on how inequality affects tax morale in Latin America and Caribbean countries using the 
Latinobarometro 2005 survey revealed that individuals who are older and have more years of education have a 
higher probability of tax morale, while individuals with a higher level of incomes and are self-employed have a 
lower probability of tax morale (Gerstenblüth, Melgar, Pagano & Rossi, 2012). Their results included an analysis 
of the effects of the Gini index and Corruption Perception Index (CPI) on tax morale. The probability for higher 
tax morale decreases when the Gini index for countries indicates less income inequality and lower CPI. The tax 
morale question in the Latinobarometer survey is asked in the following way, “Within 1 to 10 scale, where 1 
means “not at all justifiable” and 10 means “totally justifiable”, how much justifiable do you think tax evading 
is?” Responses were collapsed into 2 levels, 0 for low tax binary for all levels 1 through 8 and 1 for two levels 9 
and 10 for “not at all justifiable” and “totally not justifiable”.  
The Global Wealth Report 2013 reported that a high inequality exists with Russian billionaires owning 35% of 
all personal assets, while it is expected that billionaires worldwide collectively own 1% to 2% of household 
wealth. The Gini index is a measure of inequality that is obtained by computing the deviation of perfect equality 
line from the cumulative distribution of income function known as the Lorentz curve. In the case of perfect 
equality, the Gini index is 0% and at the extreme end, the Gini index for perfect income inequality is 100%.  
Therefore a low Gini index indicates a more equal distribution of income in the society. Figure 5 shows the GINI 
index for Russia from 1999 to 2009. 
 
 
Figure 5. Gini plot for Russia 
Data source: World Bank, World Development Indicators. 
Last updated April 23, 2013. 
 
The Palma ratio is a relatively new measure of income inequality which is derived by dividing the richest 10% of 
the population’s share of the Gross National Income (GNI) by the poorest 40% of the population’s share of GNI. 
It is observed that the Palma ratio captures about 50% of GNI for any country. The remaining 50% of the 
country’s GNI is shared between the richest 10% and the poorest 40% for which “distributional politics is largely 
about a battle between the rich and the poor for this remaining 50% of GNI, and who the middle classes side 
with.” A high Palma ratio indicates wide inequality gap, which can be narrowed by “raising the share of GNI of 
the poorest 40%, and/or reducing the share of the top 10%.” The Palma ratio and GINI index produced the 
similar income inequality outcomes, Russia Palma ratio in 1990 is 0.79, and in 2010, this ratio increases to 1.885 
(Cobham and Sumner 2013).  
2.1.2 Employment Sector Factor 
The survey question in the WVS surveys on individual employment sector is asked with three possible responses 
in the following way: “Are you working for 1. Government or public institution, 2. Private business or industry, 
3. Private non-profit organization”. The chart in Figure 6 shows the responses for individuals with complete 
observations for 2006 and 2011 survey for the Russian Federation. 
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Figure 6. Employment sector distribution 
 
Gorodnichenko et al. (2009) worked on estimating the effects of Russia’s tax reform on voluntary tax compliance 
and using the consumption-income function assumed that public or government sector employees are less likely 
to be more tax compliant after the tax reform as these individuals are expected to have legitimate incomes from 
their employers and not have other incomes from bribery or corruption. On the other hand, individuals in the 
private sector, which includes self-employed individuals, are more likely to be tax compliant due to lower tax 
rates. This assumption is confirmed by their findings that indicated there is a greater decline in the 
consumption-income gap after tax reform for private sector than for the public or government sector, with the 
largest gap decline for white collar or higher skilled workers in the private sector.  
The private non-profit sector includes Russia’s non-governmental organizations (NGO) such as environmental 
groups, religious organizations and health-care associations. According to Wikipedia (2014) NGO is funded by 
governments, foundations, businesses or private individuals.   
2.1.3 Socio-Demographics Factor 
According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) tax and development report 
(2013), the level of tax morale is affected by socio-demographics and economic variables based on an empirical 
analysis of individuals in 55 countries who responded to the tax morale question in WVS. Selected variables for 
comparison in the report shows that support for democracy has marginal effects of 12.4%, age 7.5%, trust in 
government 5.5%, female 3.5%, religious 2.7% and educational attainment 1.5%. Individuals who declared 
themselves as having a religious identity have higher tax morale, older people are less likely to cheat, women are 
more tax complaint than men, part-time workers and self-employed individuals tend to have lower tax morale 
than full-time employees and more educated individuals have more positive attitudes towards paying taxes. 
3. Results 
3.1 Hypothesis Test  
We tested the following null hypotheses to detect changes in individual tax morale for the years considered: 
1) H0: Distribution of Tax Morale in Russia is the same for 1999 and 2006 
2) H0: Distribution of Tax Morale in Russia is the same for 1999 and 2011 
3) H0: Distribution of Tax Morale in Russia is the same for 2006 and 2011 
The conventional chi-square test of independence using χ2 ignores the ordering information therefore for ordinal 
variables a trend association test is common (Agresti, 2007). To test whether there is change in the distribution of 
tax morale between years we performed the Mantel-Haenszel test to detect linear trend association. The test 
statistic utilizes the correlation in the data and it is defined as M
2
= (n-1)r
2
. Table 4 shows the results of these 
tests.  
 
Table 4. Mantel-Haenszel test results 
Null Hypothesis p-value 
Distribution of Tax Morale in Russia is the same for 1999 and 2006 0.10 
Distribution of Tax Morale in Russia is the same for 1999 and 2011 0.72 
Distribution of Tax Morale in Russia is the same for 2006 and 2011 0.24 
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The hypothesis results indicated that tax morale overall has not changed significantly over these three periods.  
A distribution for tax morale for the dataset is provided in Figure 7. The chart shows that tax morale levels for 
1999 and 2011 are about the same, while year 2006 has the largest proportion of individuals who responded that 
“tax cheating is never justifiable”, which is level “3” for the highest tax morale level. 
 
 
Figure 7. Tax morale distribution by year 
 
Given the nature of the scaled response variable, tax morale, we use an ordered probit approach in the estimation. 
Because the ordered probit estimation has a nonlinear form, we can interpret directly only the sign of the 
estimated coefficients and not their size. We calculated the marginal effects of each independent variable on tax 
morale at the highest value of the dependent variable (e.g., the value 3, or “Tax evasion is never justified”). 
To relate the tax morale to a set of independent variables, the ordered probit model is expressed in an equation 
form. 
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑡[𝑃(𝑇𝐴𝑋 𝑀𝑂𝑅𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑖 ≤ 𝑗)] = 𝛼𝑗 + 𝛽1AGE𝑖 + 𝛽2GENDER𝑖 + 𝛽3EDU𝑖 + 𝛽4MAR. ST𝑖 + 𝛽5CLASS𝑖 +
𝛽6EMPL𝑖 + 𝛽7TRUST𝑖 + 𝛽8NTL. PRIDE𝑖 + 𝛽9INCOME. SCALE𝑖 + 𝛽10WORK. SECTOR𝑖 , for j = 0,1,2,3     (1) 
The model coefficients are estimated with the R-package VGAM (Yee, 2010).   
Two scenarios are considered for 2011, one with CLASS variable in the model and one without. The ordered 
probit for each year is indicated by Table A1 and Table A2. Table A1 results are obtained with inclusion of 
CLASS variable in the model. This is done to account for the possible confounding effect with other variables. 
The model is statistically significant, for all three years, p < 0.001, in both scenarios for 2011. Here we discuss 
the variables of the ordered probit model and point out the significant one. Since the estimated coefficients from 
the ordered probit model do not necessarily lend themselves to a straightforward interpretation, marginal effects 
of significant coefficients for variables are discussed in the following section. The marginal effects of categorical 
predictors are computed with respect to a reference level and remaining predictors fixed at the mean (mode) for 
continuous (categorical) predictors. Marginal effects of continuous variables are computed with respect marginal 
change from the mean of variable. 
3.2 Significant Variables and Their Marginal Effects on Tax Morale 
Among demographic variables, AGE proved to be a significant determinant of tax morale for years 1999 and 
2011, p<0.001. Higher age appears to lead to higher tax morale in both years. The positive estimated coefficients 
have marginal effects of 0.6% and 0.5%, for 1999 and 2011 respectively. A ten-year increase in age, with respect 
to the mean age of around 45-46 years for both years, increases the likeliness of high tax morale by 6% and 5%, 
respectively. AGE is not significant for the 2006 data. 
The positive coefficient for the variable GENDER is statistically significant, p= 0.007, with a marginal effect of 
4.7% for the year 1999. For 2011, p=0.092, with a marginal effect of 3.3%. This implies that women have a 
higher probability of high tax morale than men. The GENDER coefficient is not statistically significant in 2006.  
Marital status (MAR.ST) has no significant effect for 1999 and 2011. The p value of the Wald-test for the overall 
MAR.ST effect is greater than 0.05 for these two waves of data. The model indicates variable significance, 
p<0.05 for year 2006 for the two groups “Married” and “Widowed” with marginal effects of 10% and 12% 
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respectively. 
Individual personal economic situation (CLASS) appears to have an effect on tax morality, data for 2011 only 
available. The Wald-test for overall CLASS effect has a p value of 0.029. Coefficients for people in the groups 
“Upper” and “Lower Middle” economic classes are significant, p<0.05. These groups exhibit lower tax morale 
than the reference group, “Working” class (Table 1). The marginal effects for the upper class and lower middle 
class are -33.6% and -5.1%, respectively. Being in the upper class (lower middle) decreases the probability of 
high tax morale by 33.4% (5.1%), compared to individuals who identified themselves as belonging to the 
working class. 
Employment status (EMPL) is overall significant only for 1999 with the Wald-test yielding a p value of 0.02. 
Two employment statuses for this year, “self-employed” and “student” result in lower tax morale compared to 
the reference group, “full time employed”, with marginal effects of -21.8% and -11.5%. Although there was a 
lack of overall significant effect of employment status for 2006, the status “retired” resulted in higher tax morale 
with an estimated marginal effect of 9%. There was no employment effect for 2011. 
We find that tax morale is higher for respondents with the highest level of trust (TRUST) in the government and 
justice system. It had a statistically significant, p<0.05, impact on tax morale in 1999 and 2011, with marginal 
effects estimated at 2.0% and 3.9% percentage points. The probability of high tax morale increases by more than 
2% (3.9%), with respect to the mean level of trust around 2.1 (2.3), in 1999 (2011), for an extra unit increase in 
the TRUST variable, assuming all other variables are at the same level(value). The data for 2006 does not 
indicate a significant effect of the TRUST variable.  
There is also a statistically significant positive effect of national pride (NATL.PRIDE) on tax morale for 1999 
and 2006, p<0.05. The marginal effects are 2.6% in 1999, and 4.6% in 2006. All else being equal, an increase of 
one unit in NATL.PRIDE variable, with respect to the mean level of 3.0 (3.2) for 1999 (2006), increases the 
likeliness of high tax morale by magnitude of the aforementioned marginal effects.  
The variable is significant at the 0.10 level for 2011, p=0.068, with a marginal effect of 2.3%.  
Scale of income (INCOME.SCALE) is significant with negative effects for 1999 and 2006, p<0.05. Marginal 
effect are -0.8% and -2.8%, respectively. All else being equal, an increase on one unit in INCOME.SCALE, with 
respect to the mean level of 5.9 (6.1) for 1999 (2006), decreases the likeliness of high tax morale by the 
magnitude of the aforementioned marginal effects. The variable is not significant in the presence of the CLASS 
variable for 2011, but is significant at 0.10 if the CLASS variable is not included in the model. Probit regression 
results for exclusion of the CLASS variable is provided in Table A2. 
WORK.SECTOR, proved to be significant at p<0.05 in 2011, with a -4.7% marginal effect for “Private business 
or industry”. People in the private sector are therefore 4.7% less likely to have higher tax morale than those 
employed in government institutions. For 2006, the estimated coefficient for WORK.SECTOR, “Private business 
or industry” is not significant, and is positive with a p-value of 0.3.  
4. Discussion  
The effects of a set of determinants for tax morale are estimated using an ordered probit model for Russia during 
1999, 2006, and 2011.  
Based on the distribution of tax morale in our dataset, the tax morale level is at its highest level in 1999 before 
tax reform. The transition to a market economy was tumultuous during the 1990s. A poorly conceived 
progressive taxation policy introduced in 1992 did not take into account the longstanding informal institution and 
centrally plan economy (Pogorletskiy & Söllner, 2002). In 1992, a progressive tax system was implemented, but 
lack of experience in tax administration, a bureaucratic government system, and a society that was deeply 
entrenched in connections, tax crimes and policing and corruption, led to a financial crisis in 1998. The much 
simplified flat tax system implemented in 2001 which led to significantly lower marginal tax rates for individuals 
and businesses have resulted in greater tax revenues for the country. Although it is not clear whether the increase 
in tax revenue is due to a change in individual tax compliance or to taxes collected from state-owned oil 
companies, findings from microeconomic analysis of household panel data (Ivanova et al., 2005; Gorodnichenko 
et al., 2009) provided support for an increase in tax compliance. However, tax compliance is a function of morale 
and deterrence. Individual knowledge or perception of others evading taxes, societal and tax administration 
institutions have some role in shaping tax morale. This observation has been concluded in a number of different 
studies (Torgler, 2005; Taschetti, 2013; Alm & Martinez-Vasquez, 2007). Conditional cooperation theory which 
recognizes that individuals may be willing to pay their taxes conditionally on the behavior of others in paying 
taxes, is strongly supported in an empirical study that indicated a strong correlation between perceived tax 
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evasion and tax morale (Frey & Torgler, 2007). The much simplified tax system is easier to understand compared 
to the complicated progressive system introduced in 1992, and may have some role in inducing tax compliance. 
The Figure 6 distribution chart shows a decline in tax morale in 2006 and 2011 from 1999. Hypothesis test 
results in Table 4 also indicate that there are no significant changes in tax morale from 1999 to 2006 and from 
1999 to 2011. The decline in tax morale may be due to an income inequality effect. Lower taxes reduced tax 
liability for the wealthy relative to the poor which could lead to an increase in net income inequality, income 
shifting and real productivity responses that further increase the net income for the rich (Duncan, 2012). Figure 4 
shows the available Gini index for income inequality in Russia from 1999 to 2009 from the World Bank (2014). 
The graph plot revealed that the Gini index for inequality in Russia increased from 2006 to 2007, and declined 
from 2008 to 2009. In 2009, the Gini index is at 40.1, which is still significantly higher than in 1999 at 37.5.  
Private employment is significant for 2011 with a negative marginal effect on tax morale. This may be due to the 
high level of corruption in the Russian private employment sector. According to a World Bank report (2013) on 
regulatory burden in doing business in Russia, corruption is cited as a major problem in 2011 by 33.5% of 
national and regional businesses surveyed in 2011. Although the business climate in general, has improved from 
2008 to 2011, the Russia corruption perception index in Figure 1 shows that it is still at a relatively high level. 
Our study indicates that a major change in tax structure in 2001 did not have an impact on individual tax morale 
for Russia in the three years considered. Income inequality and conditional cooperation theory may provide 
promising directions in exploring tax morale. Our findings in this study have certain limitations. Survey data 
accessed from WVS and EVS are cleaned by removing observations that have missing values. As a result, the 
remaining observations in our dataset may not be representative of the population. This may explain the varying 
effects of socio-demographic variables on tax morale in the probit regression results obtained for different years.  
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Appendix  
Probit regression  
Table A1. Results with class status variable 
Weighted Ordered Probit 
1999 2006 2011 
Coefficient z-value Marginal Effect Coefficient z-value Marginal Effect Coefficient z-value Marginal Effect 
Demographic Factors                   
AGE 0.019*** 6.789 0.006 0.001 0.265 0 0.017*** 5.55 0.005 
FEMALE 0.152*** 2.682 0.047 0.031 0.404 0.011 0.116* 1.68 0.033 
EDUCATION -0.013 -0.784 -0.004 0.006 0.274 0.002 0.006 0.325 0.002 
Marital Status 
         MARRIED -0.004 -0.039 -0.001 0.274*** 2.654 0.104 0.11 1.25 0.031 
DIVORCED -0.158 -1.461 -0.049 0.248 1.619 0.094 -0.143 -1.23 -0.045 
SEPARATED -0.254 -1.345 -0.081 0.138 0.412 0.053 -0.227 -0.956 -0.073 
WIDOWED -0.029 -0.234 -0.009 0.34** 2.012 0.127 -0.019 -0.138 -0.006 
Economic Situation 
         Class Status 
UPPER CLASS 
      
-0.943** -1.99 -0.336 
UPPER MIDDLE CLASS 
      
-0.074 -0.68 -0.021 
LOWER MIDDLE CLASS 
      
-0.175** -2.37 -0.051 
Employment Status 
         PART-TIME EMPLOYED -0.039 -0.35 -0.012 -0.081 -0.535 -0.03 -0.084 -0.695 -0.024 
SELF-EMPLOYED -0.619*** -3.02 -0.218 -0.332 -0.739 -0.126 -0.117 -0.78 -0.033 
UNEMPLOYED -0.139 -1.461 -0.043 0.092 0.546 0.032 0.256 0.878 0.062 
AT HOME -0.15 -1.31 -0.047 -0.251 -1.505 -0.095 0.049 0.187 0.013 
STUDENT -0.348** -2.01 -0.115 0.309 1.064 0.102 0.149 0.376 0.038 
RETIRED -0.139 -1.432 -0.043 0.267** 2.021 0.09 -0.013 -0.11 -0.003 
OTHER -0.284 -0.932 -0.092 0.541 0.714 0.165 0.316 0.8 0.074 
Trust and Pride 
         TRUST IN GOVT & 
LEGAL SYSTEM 0.061** 2.079 0.02 0.036 0.743 0.013 0.137*** 3.17 0.039 
NATIONAL PRIDE 0.079*** 2.708 0.026 0.127*** 2.854 0.046 0.079* 1.82 0.023 
Income Scale -0.024** -2.221 -0.008 -0.078*** -4.35 -0.028 -0.026 -1.25 -0.008 
Work Sector 
         PRIVATE 
   
0.086 1.048 0.03 -0.162** -2.218 -0.047 
PRIVATE NON-PROFIT 
   
-0.019 -0.118 -0.007 -0.112 -0.65 -0.032 
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Table A2. Results without class status variable  
Weighted Ordered Probit 
1999 2006 2011 
Coefficient z-value Marginal Effect Coefficient z-value Marginal Effect Coefficient z-value Marginal Effect 
Demographic Factors                   
AGE 0.019*** 6.789 0.006 0.001 0.265 0 0.017*** 5.54 0.005 
FEMALE 0.152*** 2.682 0.047 0.031 0.404 0.011 0.112 1.639 0.034 
EDUCATION -0.013 -0.784 -0.004 0.006 0.274 0.002 -0.004 -0.225 -0.001 
Marital Status 
         MARRIED -0.004 -0.039 -0.001 0.274*** 2.654 0.104 0.104 1.189 0.032 
DIVORCED -0.158 -1.461 -0.049 0.248 1.619 0.094 -0.145 -1.249 -0.048 
SEPARATED -0.254 -1.345 -0.081 0.138 0.412 0.053 -0.217 -0.913 -0.073 
WIDOWED -0.029 -0.234 -0.009 0.34** 2.012 0.127 -0.021 -0.148 -0.007 
Economic Situation  
      
   
Employment Status 
      
   
PART-TIME EMPLOYED -0.039 -0.35 -0.012 -0.081 -0.535 -0.03 -0.077 -0.642 -0.023 
SELF-EMPLOYED -0.619*** -3.02 -0.218 -0.332 -0.739 -0.126 -0.156 -1.058 -0.048 
UNEMPLOYED -0.139 -1.461 -0.043 0.092 0.546 0.032 0.267 0.919 0.069 
AT HOME -0.15 -1.31 -0.047 -0.251 -1.505 -0.095 0.084 0.324 0.24 
STUDENT -0.348** -2.01 -0.115 0.309 1.064 0.102 0.076 0.194 0.021 
RETIRED -0.139 -1.432 -0.043 0.267** 2.021 0.09 -0.016 -0.144 -0.005 
OTHER -0.284 -0.932 -0.092 0.541 0.714 0.165 0.316 0.802 0.08 
Trust and Pride 
      
   
TRUST IN GOVT & 
LEGAL SYSTEM 0.061** 2.079 0.02 0.036 0.743 0.013 0.132*** 3.066 0.04 
NATIONAL PRIDE 0.079*** 2.708 0.026 0.127*** 2.854 0.046 0.087** 2.026 0.027 
Income Scale -0.024** -2.221 -0.008 -0.078*** -4.35 -0.028 -0.035* -1.789 -0.011 
Work Sector 
      
   
PRIVATE 
   
0.086 1.048 0.03 -0.162** -2.189 -0.05 
PRIVATE NON-PROFIT 
   
-0.019 -0.118 -0.007 -0.13 -0.764 -0.04 
Footnotes for Table A1 and Table A2: Total number of observations for complete records with no missing values for any variables in the model are 2039 
for the 1999 survey, 1162 for the 2006 survey and 1370 for the 2011 survey. The dependent variable is TAX MORALE, measured on a four point scale 
(0 to 3). Marginal effects are calculated at the highest tax morale score (3). Reference groups are MALE, SINGLE/LIVING TOGETHER, and 
FULL-TIME EMPLOYED. Significance levels are denoted as: * 0.05<p<0.10, ** 0.01<p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
Table A3. Frequency table  
Categorical Variables 
Freq# Relative Frequency 
1999 2006 2011 1999 2006 2011 
Tax Morale 
      - Level 0 674 380 432 0.331 0.327 0.315 
- Level 1 195 88 146 0.096 0.076 0.107 
- Level 2 221 91 158 0.108 0.078 0.115 
- Level 3 949 603 634 0.465 0.519 0.463 
GENDER 
       - Male 854 534 630 0.419 0.460 0.460 
 - Female 1185 628 740 0.581 0.540 0.540 
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Marital Status 
      SINGLE/LIVING TOGETHER 286 213 287 0.140 0.183 0.209 
MARRIED 1110 719 692 0.544 0.619 0.505 
DIVORCED 271 101 195 0.133 0.087 0.142 
SEPARATED 47 14 27 0.023 0.012 0.020 
WIDOWED 318 115 169 0.156 0.099 0.123 
Economic Situation  
      WORKING CLASS/LOWER CLASS 
  
672 
   UPPER CLASS 
  
8 
   UPPER MIDDLE CLASS 
  
197 
   LOWER MIDDLE CLASS 
  
493 
   Employment Status 
      FULL-TIME 975 723 865 0.478 0.622 0.631 
PART-TIME EMPLOYED 123 69 106 0.060 0.059 0.077 
SELF-EMPLOYED 37 7 71 0.018 0.006 0.052 
UNEMPLOYED 195 62 17 0.096 0.053 0.012 
AT HOME 72 60 21 0.035 0.052 0.015 
STUDENT 63 19 9 0.031 0.016 0.007 
RETIRED 559 219 272 0.274 0.188 0.199 
OTHER 15 3 9 0.007 0.003 0.007 
Work Sector 
      GOVERNMENT 
 
614 667 
 
0.528 0.487 
PRIVATE 
 
489 651 
 
0.421 0.475 
PRIVATE NON-PROFIT 
 
59 52 
 
0.051 0.038 
Footnote: Total number of observations for complete records with no missing values for any variables in the model are 2039 for the 1999 survey, 
1162 for the 2006 survey and 1370 for the 2011 survey.  
 
Table A4. Descriptive statistics 
Continuous Variables Age Education Trust in Govt/Legal National Pride Income Scale 
Min 
1999 18 1 1 1 1 
2006 16 2 1 1 1 
2011 18 1 1 1 1 
1st Quartile 
1999 33 4 1 2 3 
2006 31 5 2 3 4 
2011 31 5 2 3 3 
Median 
1999 45 5 2 3 6 
2006 44 6 2 3 6 
2011 45 6 2 3 5 
Mean 
1999 46.3 5.1 2.14 2.96 5.88 
2006 43.8 6.46 2.26 3.24 6.08 
2011 45.2 6.57 2.25 3.09 4.37 
3rd Quartile 
1999 60 6 3 4 8 
2006 54 9 3 4 8 
2011 57 9 3 4 6 
Max 
1999 90 8 4 4 10 
2006 76 9 4 4 10 
2011 91 9 4 4 10 
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Table A5. Variable description  
Variable Definition 
TAX MORALE  Please tell me for each of the following statements whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something 
in between. Cheating on tax if you have the chance (3=never and 0=always) 
CLASSES Available 2011only: People sometimes describe themselves as belonging to the working class, the middle class, or the upper or 
lower class. Would you describe yourself as belonging to the: 
1. Upper class 
2. Upper middle class 
3. Lower middle class 
4. Working class (reference group) 
5. Lower class (reference group) 
EDUCATION  1999: What is the highest educational level that you 
have attained? 
1. Inadequately completed elementary education 
2. Completed (compulsory) elementary education 
3. (Compulsory) elementary education and basic 
vocational qualification 
4. Secondary, intermediate vocational qualification 
5. Secondary, intermediate general qualification 
6. Full secondary, maturity level certificate 
7. Higher education – lower-level tertiary certificate 
8. Higher education – upper-level tertiary certificate 
2006/2011: What is the highest educational level that you have attained? 
1 No formal education 
2 Incomplete primary school 
3 Complete primary school 
4 Incomplete secondary school: technical/vocational type 
5 Complete secondary school: technical/vocational type 
6 Incomplete secondary: university-preparatory type 
7 Complete secondary: university-preparatory type 
8 Some university-level education, without degree 
9 University-level education, with degree 
MARITAL 
STATUS 
1999: What is your current legal marital status? 
1 married 
2 widowed 
3 divorced 
4 separated 
5 never married 
6 cohabiting 
7 single  
2006/2011: Are you currently  
1 Married 
2 Living together as married 
3 Divorced 
4 Separated 
5 Widowed 
6 Single  
EMPLOYMENT 
STATUS 
1999: Employment status  
1 has paid employment: 30h a week or more 
2 has paid employment: less than 30h a week 
3 has paid employment: self employed 
4 if no paid employment: retired/pensioned 
5 if no paid employment: housewife not otherwise 
employed 
6 if no paid employment: student 
7 if no paid employment: unemployed 
8 if no paid employment: other (please specify) 
 
2006/2011: Are you employed now or not? If yes, about how many 
hours a week?  
Yes, has paid employment: 
1 Full time employee (30 hours a week or more)  
2 Part time employee (less than 30 hours a week)  
3 Self-employed 
No, no paid employment: 
4 Retired/pensioned 
5 Housewife not otherwise employed 
6 Student  
7 Unemployed  
8 Other (write in) 
TRUST IN 
GOVERNMENT/
LEGAL SYSTEM 
1999: How much confidence in: justice system? 
(4 = a great deal to 1 = none at all). 
 
2006/2011: Index (average) of the following two questions: 
Could you tell me how much confidence you have in the government in 
your capital: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, 
not very much confidence or none at all? (4 = a great deal to 1 =none at 
all). 
Could you tell me how much confidence you have in the legal system: is 
it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much 
confidence or none at all? (4 = a great deal to 1 = none at all). 
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TRUST IN 
JUSTICE 
SYSTEM  
 
1999: How much confidence in: justice system (4 = 
a great deal to 1 =none at all). 
2006/2011: Could you tell me how much confidence you have in the 
justice system: 
Is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much 
confidence or none at all? (4 = a great deal to 1 =none at all). 
NATIONAL 
PRIDE  
 
1999/2006/2011: How proud are you to be …….? (own nationality) 
1. Not at all proud 
2. Not very proud 
3. Quite proud 
4. very proud 
WORK  
SECTOR 
2006/2011: Are you working for the government or public institution, for private business or industry, or for a private non-profit 
organization?  
1 Government or public institution 
2 Private business or industry 
3 Private non-profit organization 
INCOME 
SCALE 
1999: Income household respondent  
64301 RU: 350 RUB or less per month 
64302 RU: 351-400 RUB 
64303 RU: 401-500 RUB 
64304 RU: 501-700 RUB 
64305 RU: 701-800 RUB 
64306 RU: 801-1,000 RUB 
64307 RU: 1,001-1,300 RUB 
64308 RU: 1,301-1,700 RUB 
64309 RU: 1,701-2,500 RUB 
64310 RU: more than 2,500 RUB 
2006/2011: Please, specify the appropriate number, 
counting all wages, salaries, pensions and other incomes 
that come in.  
1. Lowest group  
2.  
3. 
. 
. 
10 Highest group 
(1=lowest income group to10=highest income group)  
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